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THE SELECTION OF JUDGES*
L. L. BOMBERGERt

It might be asked at the outset whether it is worth while
to review in Indiana a book with this title. The question
of judicial selection has been discussed for nearly half a century with no visible progress. It is time that the proponents
and opponents of a change in the method of selection get on
common ground and discuss the same thing. Time and again
those favoring a non-political selection have stressed their
objective to be the maintenance of capable judges in office.
Their objection to political selection is not so much that men
should not go into office with the party which nominates
them, but that when that party, by the turn of the wheel of
political fortune, which is never static, goes out of office, the
judges must go with it. On the other hand, the opponents
say that a man who is not good enough to be a member of one
of the political parties is not fit to be a judge. There is no
answer to that argument because it is so far from the point
that it merits no discussion. Others insist upon holding the
judges on party tickets because they make excellent leaders
for weak or incompetent candidates for other offices. This
motive, of course, is not publicly discussed, but its influence
is not lost sight of in the private councils of political leaders.
The latest referendum of The Indiana State Bar Association, which was participated in by about half its membership, showed that 553 members favor a modification of the
present system with 183 opposed to it. A vote of more than
*
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A remew of Haynes, The Selection and Tenure of Judges (The
Judicial Admnimstration Series, 1944) pp. 308.
of the Hammond, Indiana bar.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

8 to 1 in favor of any proposition should impress impartial
observers with the merits of the cause. The State Bar Association caused a proposed constitutional amendment to be
introduced in the General Assembly of 1945 which was entirely free from identification with any plan or proposal. It
would merely have unshackled the General Assembly by placing in its hands power which it now lacks, that is, to provide
a method of selection other than by a political ballot. It would
give to the General Assembly power to classify counties with
respect to population, or for other reasons, and afford relief
from political selection in such centers as in its wisdom the
General Assembly might determine were entitled to such
relief. This resolution was defeated in the House by a vote
of 77 to 7, while at the same time a constitutional amendment
was proposed and adopted to meet the crying need of extending the term of county sheriffs from two to four years.

Such is politics!
The author states in his preface that his purpose is to
gather in one place the essential data bearing on the techmque of judicial selection. He has accomplished this objective admirably He adds the obvious, that the problem of
how to select judges is of fundamental importance. Unfortunately, this fact is rarely given weight by the electors until
a scandal occurs on the bench. Happily, however, from that
standpoint, the interest in the subject is sporadic and unusual.
The introduction by Dean Pound is not only a guarantee
of the merits of the book but is an essay of great value in
itself, and no one interested in the subject of judicial selection should fail to read this comprehensive discussion with
great care. He says what he and many others have repeatedly pointed out, that the whole subject of the administration
of justice arises in part out of the encroachment of the adnmstrative tribunals on judicial justice, and that we may
expect this to continue unless the courts are made wholly
adequate to a full and speedy, and not too expensive, an admimstration of justice. The judge in America, he says, is
a figure of chief magnitude.
"It is of special moment to maintain the position and functions of the judiciary in our polity because law is under attack
in a time of rising political absolutism throughout the world.
Law, as distinguished from laws, calls for judges. A politiy
carried on according to law calls for judges of the highest
order of character, ability, and professional competence."
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Only such a judge can serve the ends of justice adequately. He decries the doctrine of the disappearance of
law and of individual rights; that law is nothing but what
officials do; that they are to stand for law to the citizen
and the citizen be wholly subordinated to them. This, he
says, is the doctrine of Continental Europe, and is called
public law; that it is eating up the law which is in Englishspeaking lands in which official and private individuals stand
on the same plane before the law, in which rights and liberties of the individual are curtailed by law enforcable in the
courts, and in which the interests of one can be preferred
to those of another only by rules of law. Official lawlessness
is the most dangerous of all lawlessness. It invites anarchy
and autocracy. Our philosophy has been to insist that those
who administer the law are under the law. To maintain this
means that judges must be independent, well trained, strong
men and strong lawyers of experience and reason.
"A judge who is part of a political administration or part
of an administrative hierarchy, or a partisan of anything
but the law, is out of place in our constitutional regime."

He emphasizes the importance of responsibility on the
part of those who choose judges, the necessity of their having
competent knowledge or information as to the qualifications
of those eligible for choice, and that the selecting agency must
be one who fully appreciates the position and task of the
judiciary in our polity. The public are likely not to appreciate or to undervalue the importance of continuity and length
of judicial service. He says it is significant that the twelve
outstanding judges in American judicial history each served
at least a quarter of a century in a judicial office, and an
examination of the biographies of the judges who have made
their marks in our political history will show that length of
services has been conspicuous in substantially all of them.
The Dean very pointedly says that too much thought has
been given to the matter of getting less qualified judges off
the bench-the real remedy is not to put them on. He has a
word for the untried judge in that he remarks that he have
abundant examples of judges, of whom little was expected
when they went on the bench, giving, after a time, very
general satisfaction and at tunes acquiring distinction. It
is not a sound policy to assume that ease of getting judges
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off the bench will enable us to assure having good judges on
the bench.
The Dean lays particular stress on conditions in our
urban industrial system and the unfortunate results flowing
from the system of nomination of judges by direct primaries.
Publicity is a political asset, whereas the opinion and criticism
of the profession should be more important. Political judges
are tempted not to offend litigants of strong political influence. Moreover, there is pressure to set up a bad system of
rotation where there are many judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction. This nullifies the experience gamed by a judge m
a special type of case. Men are often nominated in primaries
whom a convention would never have thought of naming, and
no executive would have dared to choose. The strong independent lawyer on the bench who understands how to attain
ends through the law is not afraid to do things which a mediocre judge with insecure tenure will not attempt. The Dean
has come to the defense of judges who are criticized for what
is termed their conservative attitude. He says that
"After all, judges must go with the main body, not with
the advanced guard, and with the main body only when it has
attained reasonably fixed and settled convictions. To confine
the creative work of the courts within its constitutional and
legal limits and yet be able to do that work wisely, at the right
time, and in the right connections, calls for the strongest judges
we can put and keep on the bench."

Finally, he champions the courts generally in this language:
"In spite of the very general subjection of the bench to
politics involved in an elective, short-term judiciary and direct
prinary in so many states, the bench, upon the whole, has been

the soundest of our institutions."
In his general survey of the problem, Mr. Haynes says
that the chief factor in revolution is a feeling of injustice
by the mass of the people; that it has almost always been the
desire of people to have judges who could be trusted to judge
justly and without fear or favor; that we are to look upon
all the vast apparatus of government as having ultimately no
other object or purpose but the distribution of justice. This
reminds one of the declaration by Daniel Webster that "Justice is the chief business of mankind upon the earth." All
agree, the author says, that we want good judges. We agree
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on the primary qualities that a good judge must have. We
agree that we want that system of judicial selection and tenure that is most likely, taking the world as it is, to put men
of the required qualifications on the bench and keep them
there. The question that causes the difference of opinion
concerning methods of selection is how far and in what way
should judges be subject to popular control.
Chapter II is devoted to a discussion of the present
state of affairs, with a table showing the method of selecting
judges in all of the states and other jurisdictions. It is
pointed out that all judges are elected by the people in
twenty-one states, and all except some inferior court judges
in fourteen others, and in the thirteen remaining, judges are
appointed by the Governor with the consent of one or both
bodies of the General Assembly, or of the Governor's council,
or by election by the General Assembly. The California plan
is noted by which the Governor appoints with the consent of
the Commission. The lissouri plan is noteworthy in its departure from the conventional; it required a constitutional
amendment to accomplish it. The principal judges are appointed by the Governor from among three persons nominated
by a judicial commission. After twelve months of service,
the names of the judges appear on a ballot unopposed, the
question presented to the voters being merely whether they
shall be retained in office. At the end of earh term, this
process is repeated. If the voters determine that a given
judge shall not remain in office, his successor is chosen by
thp Governor and subject to the same twelve months' probationary service This is a type of recall and Missouri voters
used it in the case of one unfit judge.
Mr. Haynes calls attention to the apparent inconsistency
in the general program in Indiana in that judges of the municipal court in Indiana are appointed by the Governor while
all other judges are elected. He apparently does not know that
this system of appointment has not proved to be perfectly
satisfactory.
In a discussion of judges as candidates for non-judicial
offices, the author speaks of the traditional opposition to
such candidacy, except that in western states it is common
for judges to run for Congress, thus requiring the maintenance of their political connections and activities "to the detriment of their position and state of mind as judges." All
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the states permit a judge to be a candidate for any other
judicial office. In twenty-eight states he may be a candidate
for any office, in fourteen states, he is disqualified from being a candidate for a non-judicial office during the term for
which he is chosen; in five states a judge must resign before
becoming a candidate for a non-judicial office.
The range of judicial salaries is summarized and in
courts of last resort runs from $4,800 to $25,000, and in
trial courts from $3,000 to $25,000. This compares unfavorably with salaries in England, but is much higher than those
on the Continent, although in large centers we spend much
more for judges in proportion to population than is done in
England. In thirty states the judicial salary may not be
reduced during the term; in other states, there are varying
degrees of protection to the judge with respect to his salary.
The temptation of the opportunity to reduce salaries should
not confront legislators, especially if they are dissatisfied
with judicial decisions. There is an instance cited where for
this reason the salaries of the judges of the Supreme Court
were reduced to twenty-five cents per year.
The author cites the Federal Judiciary as the best
evidence of the virtue and faults of the method of judicial
selection of which it is typical. He says it is indisputable
that the level of efficiency for morality of the actual operation of the Federal system is no better than any state could
hope to equal; that the Presidential power of appointment and
the Senatorial power of confirmation have come to be used
largely for political purposes, at least with respect to courts
below the Supreme Court. The power of appointment, it is
revealed, is largely for practical purposes passed from the
President to the Senators. But the President carries responsibility and whatever political aspects there are to the appointment of Federal judges, if there be no senator of his
party in the state where the vacancy occurs, he refers
to Congressmen or party-leaders of his own party in that
state. Nevertheless, the author says, the system still operates
more successfully than popular elections for terms of years.
It may fairly be said that within the knowledge of living men
Federal judges in Indiana have generally refrained from activity in party affairs, and have not infrequently appointed
to offices within their disposal qualified persons of opposite
political faith.
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The appointment of Federal judges has not been immune
from attack. For nearly one hundred forty years it has
appeared in one form or another. In the last fifty-five years
over forty amendments have been proposed providing for
popular election of some or all Federal judges, and the majority of them provide for limited terms. Some would even
make the justices of the Supreme Court elective. These proposals so far have received little or no consideration in Congress, but no one can predict when a popular demand may
ripen into congressional action after it acquires sufficient
momentum.
There is an interesting chapter on English judges under
the Stuarts, and it is quite worth while to trace the development of the English system from complete subservience of the
judges to the Crown to their entire independence acquired
during the revolution of 1688. One of the reforms made by
King William on assuming the throne in 1689 was non-interference with the judicial office and thereafter judges were
appointed and served during good behavior.
The fourth chapter deals with changes that occurred in
the American system of selection approximately between 1830
and 1850. He says:
"It has been the opinion of most of the world for a very
long time that judges must be selected by some person or group
capable of making an intelligent choice; that the exigencies of
the judicial function require the judge to be free to perform
his duties without fear of reprisal; and that this latter requirement is best fulfilled by giving the judge tenure of office during good behavior."
The appointive system prevailed in the early days in
Indiana. Judges were first appointed by the governor. However, when the constitution of 1850 was adopted, Indiana got
in step with the popular movement that had been acquiring
momentum for at least twenty years in the United States
by which judges were subjected to popular election by the
people. This was one manifestation of breaking down the
power of despotic and autocratic governments. As usual, the
pendulum swung from the one extreme of practically complete subjugation by the ruler over all the affairs of the
state to complete independence with all power in the people.
No discrimination was had between the judicial office and
all others. One of the factors contributing to this was the

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

circumstance that this country was peopled largely by immigrants who were dissatisfied with the state of affairs in
the land of their fathers and had sufficient enterprise and
courage to take radical action. One manifestation of the
change was in the method of adopting state constitutions.
Usually they were conservative and only two of them had
been submitted to the people, the others being adopted in
convention, but after 1830 only two escaped approval at the
polls before going into effect. The wave of democratic fervor
that was sweeping over all the world tended in America to
bring all public officers under direct popular control, the
judges among the rest.
One of the points of irritation between Federal Courts
and the populace was with respect to deciding disputes which
involved what the states thought were their sovereign rights.
In Georgia the legislature went so far as to make it a felony
to attempt to enforce the judgment of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Chisholm v. Georgza. A Pennsylvania
legislature passed a resolution denying the Federal Court
power to adjudicate a certain controversy and at one time
the militia interfered with the United States marshal in
serving process. These contests produced some of the seeds
of secession that culminated in the Civil War. Although the
immediate issue there was slavery, yet the fundamental
theory of nullification had long been smoldering, not only in
the south but in the north.
There was much opposition to the independence of the
judiciary, Jefferson being among those who were most vocal
in expressing it. He denied that a government was republican in which any branch was supreme. In this respect he
changed his position after the decision of Marbury v. Madison.
He though the latter decision was a precedent which was also
dangerous in that judges could nullify legislation.
This chapter contains a chronological table showing the
method of judicial selection in each state from its admission
to the last change. In Indiana, we stand upon the constitution adopted in 1851 except as to certain statutory courts
thereafter created. In all of these, except the municipal courts
in Indianapolis, the judges are elected by the people.
Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to discussion of foreign
systems, including the English system. In view of the attitude of the General Assembly at the session of 1945, it is
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thought that it would be unavailing to go into a discussion of
these systems. Certainly if experience in a number of our
states is not convincing, it would be futile to relate here the
practice in foreign countries.
Chapter 7 enters a controversial field by discussing the
question of whether elected judges are more liberal. The
theory of many of the proponents of the elective plan is that
appointed judges, especially with long tenure, are too conservative. What we want is liberalism and plenty of it and,
moreover, we want it right now, is the guiding principle of
some of the most eloquent protagonists of the present system.
The theory that elective judges with short terms are
more liberal is not supported in fact. First, those who oppose the appointing system must assume that no appointing
agencies can be created which will avoid the appointment of
men of partisan temperament whether radical, conservative or
otherwise. When the appointing power is conservative, there
is no guarantee of a bench more conservative than an elected
bench would be. Federal judges during the past fifty years
have a better record from the liberal point of view than that
of their elected brethren in state courts, notwithstanding.
that the great majority of such Federal judges were appointed
by conservative presidents and confirmed by conservative
senates. Very rarely does a case touch a question of social
policy that can be affected substantially by the judge who
decides it. It is admitted that it is very difficult in large
centers of population to get and keep an able corps of judges
so long as the road to the bench is by way of popular election.
More than one-third of our entire population lives in fifty
metropolitan areas with populations from two hundred thousand upwards. In forty of these judges are popularly elected.
It should be noted again that in Indiana in the only population center exceeding two hundred thousand, the municipal
judges are appointed by the governor. This does not reach
the field of general jurisdiction because that is occupied by
the circuit court and probate and criminal courts. Regardless of how satisfactory an incumbent judge may have been
to the lawyers who are best able to judge his qualifications,
he has no chance as a candidate of a political party to escape
the fate of that party. It is common knowledge that Marion
County is not politically sure for either party. Probably it
changes the political aspect of its office holders more fre-
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quently than does any other county of comparable population.
Invariably at intervals a good judge is lost because he is
on the wrong ticket.
The author asserts that appointive courts have rarely
construed constitutions as narrowly as have the elected courts
of Indiana and other states he names. The circumstance
that judges have been elected or appointed cannot be shown
to have any appreciable direct bearing upon theii decision
of questions of constitutional policy The conservatism of an
able judge is an intellectual conservatism while that of his
inferior is instinctive and to him what is novel appears to
be dangerous. The intellectual judge, therefore, is more open
to conviction and since he is on the average superior in
ability to the elected one, he is somewhat more liberal. The
author quotes Dean Pound to the effect that most of the
illiberal decisions of which complaint was made at the beginning of the twentieth century were the work of popularly
elected judges. The author cites cases from numerous states
showing the conservatism of elected judges and among those
are Republic Iron and Steel Co. v. State, 160 Ind. 379 (1903) ;
Toledo St. L. & W R. Co. v. Long, 169 Ind. 316 (1907). He
includes the case of Thomas v. City of Indianapolis, 195 Ind.
440 (1924), upholding an ordinance prohibiting picketing.
These decisions, of course, class among the ultra conservative
in the light of social conditions at the present time.
The final chapter is devoted to retirement of judges.
Most civilized countries in the world, including the United
States government and twenty-five states, provide in one way
or another, more or less adequately, for the compensated
retirement of judges. Provisions for retirement are much
more common among the older and wealthier states. Nine
of the original thirteen have such provisions; likewise nine
of the twelve most populous states. The states in this group
which do not provide for retirement are Ohio, Texas and
Indiana. It might be added that Indiana has a sure and effective system of retiring judges, it follows the election
returns. The possibility of a judge's becoming stranded
without clients in the midst of an active and strong bar has,
undoubtedly, deterred more than one able lawyer from seeking a place on the bench.
The book contains an excellent compendium of proposals
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that have been advocated from time to time by students of
the subject. These are conveniently group as follows:
1. Appointment of Judges.
2. Election, including non-partisan elections.
3. Appointment by one agency from a list of candidates
proposed by another.
4. Plans for recommending candidates to the people or
an appointing power with authority to accept or reject.
5. Separate judicial conventions.
6. Unusual methods of confirmation.
7. Functions of the bar, including the bar primary.

This book is a valuable one, not only for reference but
for the material it contains which may be used in support
of efforts to improve the system in Indiana. The first step
to be recommended is to continue the efforts to have the
constitution amended to provide for legislative discretion and
permitting flexibility. Every man interested in the welfare
of the commonwealth should have a conviction on the question of judicial selection and should be more than passive in
efforts to attain the most desirable plan. The question will
never be disposed of until it has been settled correctly Indiana political leaders as well as thinking lawyers should
be willing to accept the concept that the judicial branch of
the government is independent of politics. The judge sits
in judgment, not in party councils. We should be reminded
of the admonition of Robert S. Taylor, President of the Indiana State Bar Association, in addressing the annual meeting in 1900:
"The right to a supreme and independent judiciary is the
right preservative of all rights. Without this no right is
secure."

